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The author examines standards for evaluating labor legislation, as found in
various disciplines, and offers attitudes helpful to their use. Standards of
draftsmanship and devices for overcoming initial weaknesses; constitutional
principles for screening out unreasonableness and governmental abuse; juris-
prudential concepts of social engineering and situation-sense--are found
in legal literature. Economic theories-laissez-faire, marginal utility, social
welfare, and institutionalism-each contribute a little to an unfinished whole.
Moral philosophy-ultimate goals like the attainment of a good life, and
intermediate objectives like the elimination of poverty-offer logical points
of departure and return. To utilize these standards in labor legislation, he
suggests and illustrates (1) an historical perspective, (2) a problem-solution
viewpoint and (3) a sophistication toward old argument.
When a federal statute regulating the internal affairs of trade unions
is heralded by some as a liberation of captives from the grip of racketeers
and by others as the enslavement of free men by bureaucrats, it should
be obvious that we need better standards for evaluating labor law.' The
need is not confined to partisans and politicians. Sincere students of
public affairs have difficulty with an appraisal of labor law because the
waters are muddied with controversy and there are few buoys or channel
markers to guide them. Nonetheless, there are standards which if used
conscientiously will aid in the evaluation of labor law.
Standards have been offered by several social science disciplines. We
shall explore first the criteria of lawyers and jurists. Then we shall
examine the standards of economists. These, we find, lead back to
philosophical premises; hence we shall also consider moral values. In
order to take advantage of those criteria of judgment which appear
valid and most promising for the evaluation of labor law, three methods
of approach are proposed-an historical perspective, a problem-solu-
t David Ziskind is a practicing attorney and arbitrator. He was educated as a lawyer at
the University of Chicago (J.D. 1925) and as an economist at Johns Hopkins University
(Ph.D. 1937). After nine years of practice in Los Angeles, during which time he was engaged
in early picketing and injunction cases, he accepted a New Deal assignment in Washington.
His NRA post was terminated in six months, but he stayed on for fourteen years. During
that time he was Principal Attorney for the United States Department of Labor and Chief
of the Manpower Programming Division of the War Production Board. He returned to Los
Angeles in 1948 for the practice of law.
He has taught labor law at the American University in Washington, D.C., and the Ex-
tension Division of UCLA. He has published a book on 1000 Strikes of Government
Employees and periodical articles on "The Use of Economic Data in Labor Cases," "Em-
ployee Benefit Plans," and other labor law subjects.
1 Hearings on H.R. 3540 Before a Joint Subcommittee of Committee on Education &
Labor, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 286, 1095 (1959). John L. Lewis has called it "a cast iron chastity
belt around the waists of 16 million men." Employer witnesses were less picturesque but
equally emphatic to the contrary.
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tion viewpoint, and a sophistication toward old argument. It would
be more comforting if there were just a few simple touchstones to test
the worth of labor law, but life situations are never that simple.
LEGAL STANDADS
Legal standards are as devious as lawyers and the multifarious interests
they represent. It is, therefore, not in legal briefs that one is apt to find
reliable standards for the evaluation of labor law. The unique contribu-
tions of lawyers and jurists to standards of labor law are found in the
philosophy of law, in constitutional principles, and in rules of legislative
draftsmanship. In most other respects, lawyers have taken over and
utilized nonlegal standards.
The popular role of the lawyer as an advocate has led to an unfortunate
emphasis upon partisan interests in his treatment of labor legislation.
Under our court system of adversary law, lawyers are expected to plead
specially for the particular interests of their clients. Such dangers as
may flow from their partisan presentation are supposedly overcome by
reposing decision making power in an impartial judge. In the legislative
process, however, there is rarely an impartial tribunal to counteract the
bias of advocates. Party platforms may commit legislators to principle,
and dependence upon constituents may have a moderating influence; but
legislators are generally not expected to be impartial. In their legislative
committees, they listen to lay witnesses plead for special interests (under
the guise of the public good), and the partisan debate is usually more
confounding than clarifying. Lawyers as witnesses are no exception. All
too commonly they attempt a defense of clients' interests rather than
an analysis of proposed legislation under professional criteria. They use
legal standards as terms to conjure with rather than as helpful standards
of judgment. We must look to other legal sources than the advocate for
reliable standards of labor legislation.
In the area of technical competence or legislative draftsmanship,
lawyers have developed helpful standards. They have made possible a
widespread consensus on whether a statute is good or bad as a work of
legal art.2 Regardless of the subject matter of the statute and its social
worth or lack of worth, the statute may be appraised as a sound or defec-
tive legal document. Some of the tests are whether it correctly expresses
the intent of the legislature, whether it is understandable to the persons
regulated, whether each duty required can be carried out, whether
2 Freund, Legislative Regulation 159-426 (1932); Lenhoff, Comments on Legislation
1001-21 (1949) ; Read & MacDonald, Cases on Legislation 786-971 (1948) ; Read, MacDonald,
& Fordham, Cases on Legislation 116-346 (2d ed. 1959).
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proper administration is provided, and whether its penalties are deter-
rents to violations. These are tests for technical soundness and as such
are standards for all legislation.
Certain weaknesses, however, are inherent in the legislative process.
Chief among these is the need for political compromise and the ambiguous
legislative language that results therefrom. This common defect is
recognized by legal experts and can be offset by standard techniques.
Labor laws, perhaps more than most other laws, embody political con-
cessions. Adoption is often possible only on the basis of compromise
language that is vague enough for everyone to assume it means what he
would like to have it mean. Competent draftsmen seek to compensate
for such deficiencies by placing the power to issue interpretations, rules,
and regulations in the hands of an administrative agency. That permits
lawyers and administrators in the regulatory agency to carry out the
declared general purposes of the legislature through interpretations or
regulations that hurdle some of the obstacles that might have held up
the adoption of the law.
These techniques and standards for drafting legislation artfully have
been supplemented by well known methods for improving legislation over
a period of time. Inadequate laws have often been accepted with the hope
of later improvement. The early hours-of-work laws were initiated as
a hortatory statement of public policy; and only in time were they
amended to set forth legally binding rules of conduct. Most labor laws
in their inception have attempted to deal with only a portion of a broad
problem in the anticipation that amendments would cope with more and
more of the problem. Initial statutory exemptions have been gradually
eliminated. The number of workers and occupations covered have been
constantly increased. Domestics and agricultural workers, traditionally
excluded from labor laws, have only recently been getting statutory
protection.8
In certain areas of legislation, such as fair employment practices and
full employment, the initial enactment has been for an investigation and
a report, with the adoption of regulatory provisions at a later date. This
process of growth has been deliberate and has followed fairly definite
patterns.
Enforcement aspects of labor legislation have likewise been improved
3 The slow process of including agricultural workers under labor law is recorded in
Beyer, Agricultural Workers Under State Labor Laws (U.S. Division of Labor Standards,
Dep't of Labor, May 1940); Ream, "Agricultural Workers and Workman's Compensation,"
Bur. Labor Standards Bull. No. 206 (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1959). The coverage of domestics
lags further behind. Progress under state workman's compensation laws is reported in
Diamond, "State Workman's Compensation Laws," Bur. Labor Standards Bull. No. 161, at
17 (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1957).
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with the passage of time. Investigation authority, subpoena powers, and
enforcement by cease and desist order, not found in early statutes, have
been added later.4
With due care, labor legislation can mature, become more sophisticated
and more effective.
These matters of legislative draftsmanship and statutory improve-
ment constitute a legal science. Though partisan debate often seizes
upon them with fury and indignation, they properly belong to the judg-
ment of legal experts concerned solely with the effectiveness of the
legislation, not with its policy. An evaluation of labor law should carefully
distinguish standards of policy from standards of effectiveness; and in
the latter area, legal standards have reached a high stage of professional
competence.
The search for standards of policy leads us to other areas of legal
precept. Logic dictates that we look first to the standards of highest legal
authority in our system of jurisprudence, namely the provisions of our
federal and state constitutions. In the evaluation of labor law, un-
fortunately, these standards have been elusive, at times inconsistent, and
until recently, inchoate.
All labor law has been weighed on the scales of constitutional principle.
Every piece of labor legislation has been put to the triple test of due
process of law, equal protection of the laws, and the separation of federal-
state powers. At their inception, statutes on factory inspection, work-
men's compensation, maximum hour, minimum wage, child labor, social
security-practically all forms of labor legislation-were found uncon-
stitutional.5 In time the same laws have been found consonant with the
same constitutional doctrines.6 Labor legislation has slithered through a
constitutional sieve.
4 For the improvement of early labor laws, primarily in the field of safety and health,
see Andrews, Labor Laws in Action (1938). Abbott, The Child and The State (1938), shows
the same technical advance with child labor laws. A comparison of the Railway Labor Acts
of 1926, 1934 and 1936 will illustrate the gradual tightening of enforcement techniques. See
44 Stat. 577 (1926) ; 48 Stat. 1185 (1934) ; 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U..C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
5 Clark, "Labor Laws Declared Unconstitutional," Bur. of Labor Bull. No. 91, at 916
(U.S. Dep't of Commerce and Labor 1910).
6 The turning of the tide is found in numerous decisions of state supreme courts but the
following Supreme Court decisions are better known and illustrative. On hour laws: compare
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), with United States v.
Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941). On wage laws: compare Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298
U.S. 587 (1936), Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), with
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator Wage Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126 (1941), West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). On child labor laws: compare Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), with United
States v. Darby Lumber Co., supra. On workmen's compensation laws: compare Ives v. South
Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), with Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
1966]
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That is not to say that constitutional doctrines have served no benefi-
cent purpose as standards of judgment. The due process clause has
helped screen out arbitrariness, capriciousness, oppression, legislative
dogma, judicial overbearing, and administrative dishonesty. The equal
protection clause has helped screen out special personal privilege,
arbitrary classification, race prejudice, class discrimination, and kindred
evils. The reservation of states rights has guarded against over-central-
ization. These constitutional standards have stood as essential safe-
guards against tyranny and abuse and are still the basis of undying
argument in defense of human liberty.
As standards for evaluating labor law, they have value but they are
not sufficient. Questions of legislative policy-the virtue or wickedness
of a labor law, its efficacy or impotence, or the need for it-are not
answered by constitutional tests. Probably the Constitution was not
designed for that purpose. At least one half century of litigation and
legal argument over the due process and equal protection clauses leaves
us just with tests for legislative purification, not with standards for
selection.
The catharsis experienced by jurists and lawyers in applying consti-
tutional doctrines to labor law has made them adept in certain techniques
for keeping statutes within constitutional bounds. Argument over consti-
tutionality has clarified and refined their legal perception. Although the
Supreme Court for many good reasons has chosen not to con'strict its
opinions by a definition of due process of law, careful students of its de-
cisions have learned to take advantage of the expanding latitude allowed
by the courts. Labor legislation need no longer be confined, as formerly,
to the protection of the weaker sex or the helpless individual. It may still
be necessary to strain the effect of local action upon interstate commerce
in order to invoke effective federal powers, yet most lawyers and legis-
lators have learned the rules of that game too. The courts have tempered
their social judgments with sweet reasonableness, and legislative drafts-
men have learned how to phrase a statute that will pass judicial scrutiny
unscathed.
Our difficulty with constitutional principles as standards of policy
attests to a basic difficulty in the use of all standards for the evaluation
of law. The standards in this instance--certain constitutional doctrines-
are sound. At least we assume them to be. Yet their application has led
243 U.S. 219 (1917), New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). On anti-union
contract laws: Compare Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930), Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917), Coppage v. Kansas 236
U.S. 1 (1915), Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), Virginia Ry. v. System Federa-
tion 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937), with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
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to diametrically opposite results at different times. Why? The fault may
be attributed to many factors-the shortcomings of judges or the inade-
quacies of lawyers or the lack of stable standards. If one seeks an ex-
planation in the differences among judges, one finds differences of social
viewpoint, personal philosophy, or worldly understanding. One discerns
that judges have used extra-legal or undeclared standards of judgment.
These call for discovery, exploration, and analysis. If one seeks an ex-
planation in the difference of presentation made before the several courts,
one finds differences in the accumulation of supporting economic and
social data. Lawyers' briefs and judicial knowledge have both reflected
a learning process. Facts, extraneous to the law, appear to influence the
application of legal standards. Whether the ambivalence of constitutional
doctrine is due to personal philosophy or objective data, both types of
explanation appear valid and call for further analysis. They reveal a need
for running through the standards used, back to basic premises, and a
need for supplementing standards with an understanding of the facts
of life.
Thinking in that vein has been done by scholars of jurisprudence, par-
ticularly those in the schools of sociological jurisprudence and modern
realism. 7 Probably most helpful for our purposes have been Pound and
Llewellyn.
Pound, in his early work, expounded the concept of social engineering
in law.' That was essentially the thought that once we acknowledge a
social purpose or objective, the role and test of law are how well it
engineers or accomplishes that purpose. That is a direct and pragmatic
standard for evaluating the effectiveness of labor law, and whenever the
social purpose is undisputed, it may serve well. We shall return to it in
our problem-solution viewpoint developed below. The social engineering
concept, however, falls short when we ask how social objectives are to
be evaluated.
7 Not all writers on jurisprudence have attempted to cast light upon standards for legisla-
tion. Those of the so-called Analytical School, who see law as a body of rules based in
custom and expanded by analogy, have explained primarily a method for developing case
law. They have regarded statutory law as an area for innovation or departure from
precedent, without offering criteria for such developments. Those writers of the so-called
Historical School, who see law as an unfolding of principles in the historical growth of
governments have usually been just analysts or recorders of the past. They have had a view-
point conducive to stability but not to growth. Those writers of the so-called Philosophical
Schools, who see law as the embodiment of ethical or metaphysical precepts, have offered
philosophical standards for legislation, which are best dealt with as philosophical rather
than legal notions. Attention is given such standards below.
8 1 Pound, Jurisprudence ch. 6 291-358 (1959). In later years, Pound unfortunately
neglected his sociological approach for an analytic viewpoint, particularly in dealing with
union activities as restraints of trade. He advocated the application of antitrust laws to




Llewellyn developed a view that he called modem American realism
He proposed finding a life-situation and accommodating the law to a
sensible solution of that life-situation. He had confidence that in the long
run, with that approach, legislators and jurists would accomplish the
sensible solution. By way of assisting them, he analyzed their logical
processes and indicated how they might think more accurately and arrive
at "situation-sense." It was in the grand tradition of the common law,
he maintained, to adapt law to make situation-sense. Only tangentially
did he write on the social premises and objectives essential to situation-
sense.
The formulation of standards for labor legislation requires attention
to social objectives. That necessarily involves a consideration of economic
data and moral and philosophical values, for which we must turn pri-
marily to nonlawyers. Lawyers have contributed the standards of crafts-
men in drafting and improving legislation; jurists have developed con-
stitutional principles that prevent legislative abuse; and legal scholars
have suggested attitudes and techniques for a proper development of
law. Their standards are incomplete without an additional consideration
of the contributions of other social scientists and philosophers.
ECONOMIC STANDARDS
Legislators are generally not expected to be economists, yet their
thinking on labor legislation is influenced by prevailing economic
theories. Of this they are frequently unaware. A more conscious analysis
of their economic hypotheses might help explain their value judgments
and aid us in formulating proper standards for labor legislation.
Let us consider the viewpoints of several prominent schools of economic
thought as they have been reflected in popular thinking. Their usefulness
in providing standards for the evaluation of labor legislation is our only
immediate concern. These economic theories may be labeled (1) laissez-
faire, (2) utilitarian, (3) social welfare and (4) institutional.
Laissez-faire. This framework of classical economic theory starts with
the premise that our economic order functions best when free competition
is allowed to prevail. Government labor regulation-except such controls
and directions as may eliminate restraints on a free labor market-is
fundamentally unsound and ultimately harmful. This theoretical view-
point (though still defended in all its logical ramifications by some
purists) is most commonly advocated as a desired goal, never fully at-
tainable, but better partially realized than totally abandoned. 10
9 Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 121-57, 200-12 (1960).
10 Von Mises, Human Action (1949); Simons, "Some Reflections on Syndicalism," 52 3.
Pol. Econ. 1 (1944).
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In historical retrospect, it is obvious that pure laissez-faire would con-
demn (in fact, did condemn) all child labor laws, all hour laws, all
safety laws, practically all trade union activity. It is still resurrected from
time to time to condemn any new piece of protective labor legislation.
Most commonly today it is utilized as the basis for recommending a new
antitrust law against "unreasonable" trade union activities. 1 Actually,
all trade unions are combinations in restraint of individual employee
contracts, and are therefore inconsistent with laissez-faire; but the theo-
retical logic of laissez-faire has generally been modified (in business
relations as well as labor relations) so that it is now commonly confined
to the realm of so-called "unreasonable" restraints on trade.
This modified laissez-faire position is a theoretical* hypothesis that
can be applied extensively or narrowly in evaluating labor legislation. It
is heard, for example, in arguments to repeal all collective bargaining
laws or in opposition to any extension of the social security laws.12 It is
basically a theory of opposition to labor legislation; it may be pressed
strongly or lightly; but it does not lead to the initiation or advocacy of
any labor law.
That does not prove nor disprove the theoretical correctness of the
modified laissez-faire position. It should be noted, however, that the trend
of legislative policy and judicial decision has been against this position.
The multiplication of labor laws limiting individual free competition
in the labor market is common history. The reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in finding such laws a reasonable exercise of police
power-reasonably designed to achieve public health, safety, and general
economic well-being-or a reasonable exercise of the commerce and tax-
ing powers of Congress has been extended farther and farther into the
field of labor regulation. Generally the Court has maintained that its own
view of public policy is immaterial, as long as the legislature's intent is
clear and defensible; but legislatures have increasingly abandoned the
laissez-faire position and the Court has found that reasonable (or not
unreasonable).
In our search for standards for the evaluation of labor law it is perhaps
most significant that the laissez-faire theorists still leave unanswered
the question of what is "reasonable" restraint.
Utility Theory. Another prominent group of economic theorists find
value in utility-the market value of a commodity lies in its utility to
11 A graphic expression of this policy was made by Thurman Arnold when he was
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, in his letter to the Secretary
of the Central Labor Union of Indianapolis, Nov. 30, 1939, on file in Cornell Law Library.
See also Edwards, "Public Policy Toward Restraints of Trade by Labor Unions; An Eco-
nomic Appraisal," 32 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 432 (1942); Meltzer, "Labor Unions,
Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws," 6 J.L. & Econ. 152 (1963).
12 Petro, The Labor Policy of the Free Society (1957).
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the marginal purchaser. The test of utility then becomes a way of looking
at all economic relationships-buying and selling, employment and wages,
and laws affecting those economic relationships-from the standpoint of
whether or not they reduce or increase utilities.
Such a standard is difficult to apply.:'3 There is no way to test or
record the utility experienced by most people, or even to measure and
compare the utilities experienced by any two persons. Utilities are psy-
chological-peculiarly within the minds of individuals. They may deter-
mine how people act in the economic market. Buyers may select goods
and services on the basis of the respective utilities they anticipate from
those goods and services; and the payment of a price is a form of mea-
surement of subjective utilities. However, laws are not purchased by an
exchange of dollars, and we have no simple way of measuring the utilities
people get or expect to get from them. Laws may be purchased by an
exchange of votes; but there is no common denominator for votes. Legis-
lators vote on their own conception of the utilities involved or on what
they think are the utility notions of their constituents. Persons who may
seek to evaluate laws on the standard of the respective utilities involved
must rely on guesses as to what other people are thinking or will think
in the future.
If we ask whether a law requiring secret elections for union officers
or a higher minimum wage increases utilities, we have no ready way to
determine its potential in utilities. We find ourselves asking merely how
much will the law give people of the things they want, or how many peo-
ple think the law will be useful to them, or how many people want the
law. That gives us no independent standard of evaluation.
Social Welfare. A number of economists have maintained that economic
life should not be viewed abstractly as an operation of supply and demand
in a free competitive market, nor is it sufficient to add the psychological
factor of utility; but it is necessary to look at the economic activities
of human beings as an effort to satisfy all their wants and needs.' 4 To
them, economics is the business part of the human struggle for individual
and social well being. This viewpoint stresses the welfare objectives
of economic laws. If labor law is to be evaluated according to its pro-
pensity to promote social welfare, we have another standard-a broad,
all encompassing, moral or philosophical standard. Its strength is that
it recognizes the fact that man does not live by bread alone, and it
obliges us to consider and weigh his other motivations and satisfactions.
13 Buchanan, "Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy," 2 J.L. &
Econ. 124 (1959).
14 2 Haley, Survey of Contemporary Economics (1952); Hicks, "The Foundations of
Welfare Economics," 49 Econ. J. 696 (1939); Stigler, "The New Welfare Economics," 33
Am. Econ. Rev. 355 (1943).
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Its weakness is that it offers no objective or simple or universally ac-
ceptable method for ascertaining what specifically constitutes social
welfare or specifically how it is promoted. That is the deficiency of all
moral standards-more of which will be said below-yet the social wel-
fare viewpoint emphasizes the unavoidability of applying some moral
standard.
Institutional Analysis. Other economic theorists have urged that
the way to avoid unreality through abstract, laissez-faire, or utility theo-
ries and to supply meaningful content to social welfare theory is to
study economic institutions specifically and concretely, to discover what
they really are and how they really function.15 Then it may be easier to
determine how or what the institutions should be. Applied to labor laws,
this institutional viewpoint has produced detailed analyses of the eco-
nomic problems in our society and of the effects of legislation on those
problems. Such studies have been undeniably helpful in the evaluation of
labor legislation. Still they have not always provided definitive answers
to questions such as what do we want to accomplish and which of the
many effects of a law do we desire most.
The economic standards vary considerably in their usefulness as stan-
dards for evaluating labor law. Laissez-faire has been essentially negative
and at best leaves unanswered the question of what is a reasonable
restraint of trade. Utility theories have been subjective and dependent on
an analysis of what others regard as utility. Social welfare theories have
demonstrated a need for social values without supplying a readily usable
set of values. Institutional studies have furnished detailed and helpful
analyses of specific labor law situations without general standards of
evaluation. Some scale of social priorities, some moral objective, some
policy goal must be combined with economic theories to produce ade-
quate standards for the evaluation of labor law. Because moral judg-
ment is inescapable, we shall direct our attention to some of the most
common moral standards.
MORAL STANDARDS
The search for satisfactory moral standards has garnered many elixirs,
appealing to many tastes. The choice is at times bewildering. Great
moralists have sought to help us make a selection. Some have urged a
15 J. D. Brown, "Social Insurance; A Problem in Institutional Economics," 47 Am. Econ.
Rev. Papers & Proc. 462 (1957) ; Copeland, "Institutionalism and Welfare Economics," 48 Am.
Econ. Rev. 1 (1958); Witte, "Economics and Public Policy," 47 Am. Econ. Rev. 1 (1957);
Witte, "Institutional Economics as Seen by an Institutional Economist," 21 So. Econ. 3.
131 (1954). The contributions of institutional. economists of course consist not only of
theoretical discourses, but even more of a great multitude of factual studies made, some of
them, and mostly by research workers, in government and out, whose work was prompted
by the institutional viewpoint. For illustrative studies on the effects of minimum wage laws,
see note 27 infra.
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short cut in our labors by pleading for faith in divinely ordained stan-
dards; others have insisted that man evolve and apply his own standards
in a humanistic process of self perfection. In all, the philosophers have
proliferated a vast array of moral values. It would be foolhardy to at-
tempt within the scope of this paper to proclaim and defend a single
standard as the highest standard of moral judgment. It should suffice
for our purpose in seeking standards for evaluating labor legislation to
clarify the use of moral values and to suggest several values that may
be helpful.
The real worth of moral values in labor law appears to be in their
usefulness as a basic premise.16 Moral values are the point at which
most people agree and on which laws may rest. If law is to provide stabil-
ity in human relations, it must be founded on acceptable premises. Moral
values are also a directive indicating to reasonable men how they can
proceed to make a choice between possible alternative laws. They are the
signposts to progress.
In this context we may list some of the most widely advocated moral
standards:
1. Justice, truth and goodness;
2. The good life;
3. The golden mean;
4. Natural law;
5. The greatest happiness for the greatest number; and
6. The fullest development of man's capacities-in their individual
and social aspects.
As stated, nearly all of these are noncontroversial. Only when they are
expounded and made more specific is there a serious difference of opinion
over what they mean or how they should be applied. Problems arise when
justice is defined to mean that each person should get what he deserves
rather than what he needs; when the good life is interpreted to call for
the giving of charity instead of the requirements of a contract; when
the golden mean is said to be half way between certain extremes; when
natural liberty is defended in action that is deemed dangerous by others;
when the beneficiary is unwilling to accept what may be most conducive
to his happiness; or when a choice must be made as to which human ca-
pacities are to be developed first. And in a host of other dilemmas, the
usefulness of these moral standards becomes obscure. Nonetheless, they
are good starting points, they offer some direction, they demand a justi-
16 A provocative discussion of the relationship between morality and law is found in
Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals (1933).
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fication in terms generally acceptable, and they are a point of reference
on which differences of opinion may be diminished. The important factor
is that one of these moral standards is to be used. Labor laws are to
be justified or condemned in terms of that standard. The mere process
of scrutiny, under a commonly accepted moral standard, will help in
the evaluation of any labor law, and is in practice indispensable to a
satisfactory evaluation.
To reason from a specific labor law back to a moral end is a long, time
consuming task. Consequently we seek more immediate goals-subordi-
nate moral ends. In the field of labor law, we have generally established
several intermediate points of moral justification. Some of these are the
following:
1. The elimination of poverty;
2. The preservation of life, health, and safety;
3. The protection of those whose economic power is not sufficient to
protect themselves;
4. The preservation of economic freedom.
These standards are also generally acceptable. In their application to
specific economic situations, however, they receive many qualifications.
The objective of economic freedom is perhaps most subject to debate.
Economic freedom in itself is basic to our way of life; but when economic
interests conflict, the freedom to pursue one economic interest may not
be consistent with the freedom to pursue another economic interest. In
the field of labor law, the incompatibility of possible freedoms has become
fairly obvious.
In early labor law cases the courts spoke of the correlative and equal
rights of employers and employees and claimed to protect the freedoms
of both equally.17 They balanced the freedom to hire and fire with the
freedom to accept work or reject it; the freedom of access to a labor
market with the freedom to seek work anywhere; the freedom of setting
conditions of employment with the freedom of stipulating terms of work.
Both employer and workers were said to be equally free to contract at
will; and any interference with the exercise of that freedom was con-
sidered unlawful. In time it became apparent that all economic freedoms
were limited by economic circumstances; and employer and employee
were not equal in the exercise of their theoretical freedoms."8 The freedom
17 "In all such particulars the employer and the employ6 have equality of right, and
any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of
contract which no government can legally justify in a free land." Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (holding a federal law against yellow dog contracts unconstitutional).
18 In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898), it was said:
the proprietors of these establishments and their operatives do not stand upon an
equality, and... their interests are, to a certain extent, conflicting. The former naturally
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of the child to contract for hazardous work was absurd. The freedom of
the employer to blacklist union members and the freedom to hire indus-
trial spies and armed guards were incompatible with the freedom of the
employee to seek work or to ask for improvement in his conditions of
employment.
The moral standard of economic freedom is sound, but not absolute.
It may be well to require a justification for each limitation of freedom;
but it must be recognized that some limitation of freedom is implicit in
every economic situation and the unrestrained exercise of freedom may be
socially harmful. The important question has become not whether eco-
nomic freedom is impaired, but how much economic freedom may be
preserved without the sacrifice of other economic and social ends.
That process of reasoning, the weighing of pros and cons, the balancing
of social interest, is the way in which all standards must be applied.
There is no automatic nexus between goals and their attainment. Stan-
dards are tools that can be used skillfully or ineptly. To insure their
optimum use in the evaluation of labor law, there are several helpful
attitudes or methods of approach. These are (1) an historical perspective,
(2) a problem-solution viewpoint and (3) a sophistication toward old
argument.
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
When viewed against a background of history the significance of a
labor law becomes more apparent. At the time of its initial proposal,
a statute is commonly associated with extraneous factors, such as im-
mediate crises, sensational revelations, pride of sponsorship, and fear of
the unknown. These distort the law's real character out of true proportion.
In time the picture is corrected. Alleged facts are proved or disproved.
Anticipations are confirmed or discredited. Unsound provisions are fre-
quently amended or interpreted to produce better results. History is
curative. It seems prudent, therefore, in evaluating labor laws to stand
back and view them in historical perspective.
The development of labor law in the United States has been recorded
in scholarly works. 9 For our purpose it may suffice to point up a few
desire to obtain as much labor as possible from their employ~s, while the latter are
often induced by the fear of discharge to conform to regulations ... detrimental to ....
health .... In such cases self-interest is often an unsafe guide ....
In American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209
(1921), Chief Justice Taft wrote that "a single employee was helpless in dealing with an
employer .... Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with
their employer."
19 Commons & Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation (1936); Millis & Brown, From
the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley (1950); Millis & Montgomery, The Economics of Labor
(1945). The United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau
of Labor Standards of the United States Department of Labor have published annually, and
for special subjects at greater intervals, accounts of all labor legislation.
[Vol. 51
EVALUATING LABOR LEGISLATION
general observations and to illustrate the historical perspective in a
sampling of recent legislative proposals.
Generally, labor law in the United States has reflected the state of our
economy and its current problems. As we struggled to get more and more
out of our physical and human resources, we made constant adjustments
in our laws. We rarely stood still. Certain problems were recurrent, but
our laws responded to them in ever changing context. To the extent that
we have overcome problems such as poverty, excessive hours, occupa-
tional hazards, child labor, and the risks of old age, our remedial efforts
have been facilitated by labor laws.
In our colonial period we were primarily concerned with a scarcity of
labor, aid we sought solutions in slavery and indentured servants. These
required special laws. Trade-minded colonies with mercantilistic policies
experimented with statutory wage fixing. Our population spread, took on
new forms of trade and agriculture, and as we modified our colonial
economy, we changed our labor laws.
In the period between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, we increased
commerce and started manufacture. Emergent unionization brought a
clash between free competition and organized economic activity. The
criminal conspiracy doctrine outlawed union activity, but later gave way
to a popular insistence upon the lawfulness of self-betterment through
peaceful means. Then followed a long series of empirical laws and court
decisions as to what constitutes self-betterment and lawful means.
The Civil War culminated in the greatest labor upheaval of our history.
The bulk of our agricultural working population and a substantial portion
of our urban laborers were catapulted from slavery to freedom. Consti-
tutional amendments were found necessary for this revolutionary trans-
formation; and the legal repercussions are still in motion.
The industrialization of our country following the Civil War brought
many new labor problems. Factory production posed questions of safety
and health. The great influx of immigrant labor raised issues of wage
collection and low wages. Woman and child labor were accentuated. The
establishment of unions on a national footing presented a multitude of
problems ranging from the rights of a single blacklisted employee to the
overall restraint of trade in interstate strikes. Labor legislation and judi-
cial doctrines were designed to cope with each of these many problems.
Each major economic development-the closing of our frontiers, the
concentration of industrial ownership, the ups and downs of the business
cycle, war, and peacetime readjustments, the expansion or contraction of
foreign trade, the cold war with Russia, foreign aid programs, automa-
tion-each has had its impact upon labor law. Old labor problems have
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taken on new forms; and old labor laws have been re-evaluated. Some-
times laws have been altered to meet new contingencies; sometimes the
old law has been found sufficient and left untouched.
Certain trends can be noted as bench marks of progress. (1) We
started our industrial era with labor laws designed to protect the weak
worker. These were laws on safety and health, child labor, woman labor,
hours, wage payment and collection. (2) We then enacted a series of
labor laws designed to advance good labor standards. These were laws on
minimum wages, maximum hours, workmen's compensation. We did this
first on a state level and then on a federal level. (3) We later adopted
laws designed to assure economic security. These were laws on employ-
ment exchanges, unemployment compensation, old age pensions, full
employment, and equal employment opportunity. All of these trends and
objectives have withstood the challenge of partisan debate and court
contest." They have survived changes in political administration. They
have won the approval of historical experience. The only issues that
seriously remain with these laws are how much further should they be
extended or how can their administration be improved.
In the area of union organization and labor disputes, we have also
charted trends, but not with the same historical consensus.
The law pertaining to labor disputes has been in a continuous state of
flux. We have always sought industrial peace; but at the same time we
have desired to preserve the right to strike. In our early history we raised
one legal hurdle after another against strikes, picketing, and boycotts.
The restrictive legal doctrines of criminal conspiracy, malice, interfer-
ence with contract, and restraint of trade, each reigned for a while only
to be dethroned by new court decisions or new legislation. New doctrines
of lawful means and lawful purposes were subjected to unending inter-
pretations-rarely consistent with each other. For a period, court injunc-
tions against union activity, without a consideration of the merits of the
dispute, became commonplace. Federal and state laws then curtailed
the use of such injunctions. From time to time states passed laws against
picketing and boycotts; but in most instances these have been held un-
constitutional. Mediation and arbitration statutes were enacted in every
jurisdiction; still they have never been regarded as completely adequate.
The Wagner Act and the contemporaneous United States Supreme Court
decisions on picketing gave the militant activities of unions their max-
imum protection. Then the trend was reversed in the Taft-Hartley Act.
20 It may be early to state that equal employment opportunity laws have withstood the
challenge of partisan debate and court contest, but the Supreme Court has approved the
basic principles involved and even if events now unforeseen should produce counteregsla-
tion, it is not likely to do more than modify existing remedies. Substantively, laws against
racial and ethnic discrimination are unmistakably in the mainstream of history.
[Vol. 51
EVALUATING LABOR LEGISLATION
Similar ambivalence has existed with the law on unionization and col-
lective bargaining. We have practically always affirmed the right to
organize; but we have vacillated between protecting collective bargaining
and restricting it. After some legal quibbling we outlawed blacklisting
and yellow dog contracts and treated unions as voluntary, benevolent
societies. Collective bargaining was gradually given the status of a con-
tractual relationship. Then the New Deal created an affirmative obliga-
tion to bargain collectively. It prohibited antiunion activities and gave
unions representative of a majority of the employees exclusive bargain-
ing rights. That was a high point of union protection. The Taft-Hartley
Act stopped the trend and started a counter-march.
The Taft-Hartley Act gave positive protection to anfiunion employees
as well as pro-union employees. It placed an administrative agency and
court injunctions behind this policy. It also outlawed forms of boycott
and picketing that had theretofore been lawful. For the first time in
American labor law history a major policy trend was broken and a
counter-march begun. State restraints upon unions-employment peace
laws and right-to-work laws-followed. The Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act coupled regulations desighied to ensure honesty
and democracy in unions with new restrictions upon organizational pick-
eting and "hot cargo" agreements. Whether this counter-march will en-
dure historically, it is too early to determine, for it has not yet weathered
a fundamental change in economic climate, and it has only recently en-
countered a change in political administration policy.
This historical perspective does not supply answers to many detailed
questions concerning the validity of labor laws; but it does enable one
to evaluate labor law in terms of its consistency with custom, its relation
to long run needs, and its soundness under the test of experience. For
certain labor laws, those designed to protect the weak worker, those
designed to advance basic labor standards, and those designed to assure
economic security, the historical demonstration is quite decisive. For
other laws, those pertaining to labor disputes, union organization, and
collective bargaining, the historical trends are not certain or settled.
Historical perspective illuminates facts essential to an evaluation of
labor law.
A PROBLEM-SOLUTION VIEWPOINT
The evaluation of labor law may be improved further by a proper
inquisitorial attitude. That consists of asking what problem the law is
designed to meet and how well it may accomplish that end.
The problem-solution test goes to the essential core of a labor law.
It assumes that law has a purpose and should be reasonably designed to
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serve that purpose. It examines the need for action and defines the
scope of the problem. Implicit in this is a determination as to whether
the problem is worth the trouble and expense of treatment; or perhaps
more accurately, just what is or is not important and what is or is not
urgent. Once having found and defined a problem requiring attention,
the test weighs the likelihood that the proposed law will solve that prob-
lem. This is a reasoning approach and as such it is apt to lead to sound
evaluation.
Interrogation about a problem and its solution eliminates immaterial
questions. Who is the proponent or opponent of the bill? Is he sincere?
What are his motivations? Such matters may be material to political
horsetrading but do not affect the value of a labor law.
This viewpoint also avoids irrelevant considerations. Is the law
precedented or novel, progressive or conservative? Is it good for every-
one? Does it treat employer and employee equally? Such questions
usually have no reasonable bearing upon the proposal. The merit or
lack of merit in a labor law rests upon other considerations.
The problem-solution viewpoint also discards mere name calling. Is
the law American or Communist? Is it the social welfare state? Is it just
the aberrant brain child of a do-gooder or a reactionary? Intelligent eval-
uation must rest on more than emotion.
The mental process employed in evaluating labor law can be kept on
a rational plane through the problem-solution viewpoint. If a legal stan-
dard like the due process clause is being applied, questions about the
problem and its solution go directly to the reasonableness of the govern-
ment action. If an economic standard like optimum utility is being ap-
plied, questions about the problem and its solution point up the areas in
which utility is to be sought. If a moral standard like the maximum de-
velopment of individual capacities is being applied, the problem-solution
questions pry out the individuals and their capacities that are involved.
Whatever the standards on which an evaluation is to be made, the most
pertinent facts will be elicited if the problem-solution approach is made.
THE SOPHISTICATED APPROACH
In the realm of labor law, it is extremely important to know what has
been discovered by others. The subject is controversial. Relevant facts
are numerous. Rationalization is easy. If we are to evaluate the law
properly we should take advantage of the research and thoughtful anal-
ysis that have already been made. That is the essence of sophistication
(which in the absence of omniscience serves very well).
The fund of available knowledge pertinent to labor law is much more
[Vol. 51
EVALUATING LABOR LEGISLATION
extensive than most persons think. There is practically no labor problem
to which some serious study has not been given. This can be well illus-
trated with respect to recently enacted labor laws, the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as well as with a law scheduled for further debate, the
extension of minimum wage regulations to agricultural labor.
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was
designed to accomplish, among other ends, honesty in the handling of
union funds and democracy in the conduct of union affairs. These ob-
jectives were not in dispute. Only the particular techniques and standards
of regulation were debated. Thousands of pages of testimony were taken
on the subject-most of it unsupported opinion. Under our representative
form of government that is unavoidable and indeed proper. In sifting the
material, however, a sophisticated attitude would ask what studies of
union democracy and fiduciary responsibility have been made and how
have similar problems been dealt with in our economy. Existing studies
point up not only the absence of a vibrant democracy in many unions,
but also some of the root difficulties-lack of personal communication
within large groups, indifference bred by impersonal jobs, an unques-
tioning solidarity as protection against outside attack, inertia, and voter
lethargy.2' These causal conditions have not been dealt with adequately
by formal provisions in union constitutions. But can they be cured by
legal rules of due process? Have the provisions of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act even been considered as dealing with such
causes of union difficulty? With respect to fiduciary responsibility, there
has been extensive experience with the safeguarding of money in banks,
insurance companies, and business trusts and some study of the fiscal
policies and practices of large unions. Whether the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act is what Congress should have enacted can
be answered best by a sophisticated analysis of the many facts that have
been common knowledge among students of labor problems for years.
The equal employment opportunity section of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,22 presents many facets toward which a sophisticated viewpoint
is essential. In the Congressional hearings on the measure, there was a
21 Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy (1959); Lester, As Unions Mature
(1958); Seidman, Union Rights and Union Duties (1943); Segal, "Some Efforts at Demo-
cratic Union Participation," 48 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 53 (1958); Seidman, "Some
Requirements for Union Democracy," 48 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 35 (1958); Sum-
mers, "The Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy," 48 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers
& Proc. 44 (1958); Taft, "Democracy in Trade Unions," 36 Am. Econ Rev. Papers & Proc.
359 (1946); Taft, "Opposition to Union Officers in Elections," 58 Q.J. Econ. 246 (1944);
Taft, "Understanding Union Administration," 24 Harv. Bus. Rev. 245 (1946); Wolfson,
"Union Finances and Elections," 248 Annals 31 (1946).
22 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
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sharp contrast between the statements offering evidence of economic
discrimination based on race and the unsupported pleas for self-determi-
nation in states that had no record of attention to the problem.2" Ref-
erence to serious studies, however, was overshadowed by emotional,
moral, and constitutional issues. Congressional debate reflected a great
social cleavage. Both sides understood what they wanted and the time
was not for objectivity.
In an effort to placate opposition or to attract doubtful votes, con-
cessions were made. Instead of establishing an administrative agency
with customary power to enforce cease and desist orders, enforcement
was limited to conciliation and court action. Little public attention was
given this avoidance of usual administrative procedures. In time, the
act will need to be re-evaluated in the light of state as well as federal
experiences with such procedures.
Another by-product of controversy was the extension of the law to
sex discrimination. On the floor of the House, Congressman Howard W.
Smith of Virginia, a man known for consistent opposition to social legis-
lation, moved to add sex to race, color, religion and national origin
Apparently intending to reduce the bill to an absurdity, he might have
been voted down.25 Instead, sex discrimination was recognized as an old
problem (principally by the female representatives in the House), and
it was caught up in the tide of civil rights. There now arise a multitude
of perplexing policy questions. To what extent are state regulations,
designed many years ago to protect women against hazards of night
23 Compare testimony of Hon. W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, with that of Hon.
Albert Watson, U.S. Representative from South Carolina in Hearings Before Subcommittee 5
of the House Committee on the judiciary on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding Civil Rights,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1489-94, 1705-21 (1963). Pertinent economic data were incorporated
into the Judiciary Committee report. H.R. Rep. No. 914, pt. 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-30
(1963).
24 For 46 years, the National Women's Party and a long list of conservative women's
organizations, sought the amendment of the Constitution to prohibit the denial or abridg-
ment of equality of rights on account of sex. Senator Hayden repeatedly blocked adoption by
an exception for laws enacted to protect women. The National Consumers League, the League
of Women Voters, and other liberal groups campaigned instead for protective legislation,
from safety laws in the first decade of the century to the equal pay law of 1963. The
Supreme Court accepted the biological disabilities of women as well as their economic weak-
nesses as a basis for the reasonable exercise of state police power. Circumstances have
changed. Women now perform functions traditionally considered beyond their ability. The
roles of the family and women in -society have been altered. A sophisticated approach to
present laws calls for the same kind of reliance upon factual research as was demonstrated
in the Brandeis briefs in the early cases.
25 In introducing his amendment, Congressman Smith said "I do not think it can do any
harm to this legislation; maybe it can do some good." He went on to read a letter from a
woman asking him to correct the imbalance between married males and females and to
protect the spinster in her right to a nice husband and family. 110 Cong. Rec. 2577 (1964).
Congressman Celler, the floor leader on the civil rights debate, sought to void the amendment
by indicating that a Presidential Commission on Women had suggested separate legislative
treatment, and he asked the members of the House to "wait until mature studies have been
made" of the subject, to no avail. Id. at 2578.
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work and weight-lifting, now hobbling their economic opportunity? Does
the law protect men against preferential treatment accorded some women?
Without the guidance of a Congressional committee report or a clear
showing of legislative intent, it will be necessary to evaluate the letter
of the law through a sophisticated analysis of industrial practices.26
The current session of Congress, and possibly others to follow, will
consider the enactment of a minimum wage law for agricultural workers
on large corporate farms. Many of the arguments advanced time and time
again in minimum wage hearings of the past will be repeated. A sophis-
ticated attitude toward those arguments will take advantage of the large
number of studies made on the effects of past minimum wage laws.27
Those studies show that minimum wage laws have not driven the marginal
producer out of existence, have not made the minimum the maximum,
have not supplanted women and children with men, and have not resulted
in corresponding price increases or substantial price increases. They
show that minimum wage laws have often forced marginal producers to
increase their efficiency and that minimum wage laws have generally
eliminated unconscionably low wages. Those studies will not deter par-
tisans from reiterating contentions that should have been laid to rest
by the accumulated research. But persons seeking to evaluate the pro-
posed law on the basis of generally acceptable standards will find their
task considerably lightened by a sophistication that embraces existing
research on the subject.2"
SUMMARY
Our inquiry into standards for evaluating labor law has scanned the
skies, and sought to chart a few lode stars.
In the realm of legal principle, we have noted that the constitutional
26 The Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex issued by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 30 Fed. Reg. 14926 (1965), announces that the Women's Bureau of
the Department of Labor is to report on the relevance of the law to current technology
and women's increasingly important role in society.
27 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Report of the Secretary of Labor to Congress Under Section 4(d)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (1963) ; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor,
Effect of the Minimum Wage Reps. 116-17, 124, 126-27, 129-30, 132, 136, 176 (1955-57),
summarized in Schaffer, "Effects of the $1.00 Minimum Wage in Six Areas, 1956-59," 83
Monthly Labor Rev. 472 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor 1960); Douty,
"Some Effect of the $1.00 Minimum Wage in the United States," 27 Economica 137 (1960);
Tolles, "Purposes and Results of United States Minimum Wage Laws," 83 Monthly Labor
Rev. 238 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor 1960). Peterson, "Employment
Effects of State Minimum Wages for Women," 12 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 406 (1959), attempts
to demonstrate that earlier reports minimizing the effect of such laws on employment are not
conclusive.
28 A very fine study of data pertinent to minimum wage law for agricultural workers has
been published recently. Kantor, Cronemeyer & Hauser, Problems Involved in Applying
a Federal Minimum Wage to Agricultural Workers (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1960). The executive
departments of the federal government usually have available or are able to make available
to Congress similar research on all major pieces of labor legislation.
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standards of due process, equal protection and federal-state separation
help to decontaminate man-made laws, but do not provide them with a
spirit of vitality. Legal expertness does offer techniques for drafting
laws that can function well. Writers on jurisprudence have suggested
helpful approaches to good law.
In the area of economic thought, additional standards are available.
Laissez-faire, though inconsistent with nearly all regulation, has been
modified to permit "reasonable" economic restraint; utility theories stress
the psychological aspects of evaluation; social welfare theories emphasize
the moral aspects; and institutional theories offer pragmatic studies of
economic situations. Each contributes a little and leaves a little un-
determined.
The galaxy of moral values presents some planetary and some satellite
standards. Whether we accept as our ultimate goal the good life or the
highest development of individual capacities or one of many other moral
ends, we have a sound starting point for evaluation. Men generally will
accept the same premise and will proceed from there to any conclusion
that can be demonstrated to flow logically therefrom. Without such a
basic point of agreement, most argument is futile. The process of logic
may be shortened by adopting an acceptable intermediate moral end like
the elimination of poverty or the preservation of economic freedom. Such
standards usually require more qualification. Moral values, nevertheless,
are essential pole stars, fixed points of departure and return. In the
evaluation of labor law they are the only reliable standards for ultimate
conclusions.
These various standards can be used well or poorly, and to assure
their optimum utilization in the evaluation of labor law, it is highly
desirable to assume (1) an historical perspective, (2) a problem-solution
viewpoint, and (3) a sophistication toward old argument. The historical
perspective removes from needless cavil the basic laws on safety, wages,
hours, child labor, social security, and full employment, and it brings
the benefit of experience to evaluations of legislation on union organiza-
tion and labor disputes. The problem-solution viewpoint directs and con-
fines attention to specific needs and weighs alternative proposals in a
reasoning process. Sophistication in argument takes advantage of prior
research and avoids much of the disingenuous repetition of old canards.
These proposals may lack the certainty of scientific propositions or
popular dogma. They are not simple or self-executing. Yet they offer a
sound and effective basis for the evaluation of labor legislation.
